President Trump’s threat to obliterate Iran’s civilization evokes the Cold War–era Madman Theory advanced by Richard Nixon and Dwight D. Eisenhower — a strategy built on calculated unpredictability. By projecting the image of a leader willing to take extreme, even irrational action, the doctrine seeks to frighten adversaries into concessions at the negotiating table.
Nixon famously used this tactic to convince North Vietnam and the Soviet Union that he might resort to nuclear escalation. President Trump’s rhetoric toward Iran appears to follow a similar script: forceful language designed to coerce Tehran into diplomatic submission.
Yet the effectiveness of such brinkmanship remains contested. Analysts argue that Iran’s leadership may not be intimidated and could instead draw domestic strength from defying American threats. The fact that both Washington and Tehran claim strategic advantage suggests that the outcome remains ambiguous.
Supporters of Trump’s approach point to Iran’s historical hostility toward Israel and the United States — including repeated calls for Israel’s destruction and reported plots against American officials — as justification for adopting a hardline posture.
Still, the moral dilemma persists: can reciprocal threats of annihilation produce stability, or do they merely escalate tensions?
The global reaction underscores the gravity of the moment. European governments convened emergency discussions in Brussels as the conflict reverberated across diplomatic and economic corridors. The crisis, now weeks old, has disrupted global markets and heightened anxieties over energy security, particularly around the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.
Statements by Kaja Kallas following deliberations within the European Union Foreign Affairs Council reveal a continent grappling with uncertainty. While advocating a mediated process to end Iran’s nuclear ambitions, she conceded that Europe lacks clarity regarding Washington’s broader objectives.
This ambiguity helps explain Europe’s cautious stance. Unlike previous Gulf crises — when transatlantic coordination was more robust — the current situation appears marked by limited prior consultation. Consequently, European leaders are balancing diplomatic engagement against the risk of military entanglement, particularly after Tehran warned it would retaliate against any EU state aligning militarily with the US or Israel.
Whether President Trump’s application of the Madman Theory ultimately compels negotiation or entrenches resistance remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the strategy has succeeded in commanding global attention — and raising the stakes far beyond the Middle East.
As Europe seeks to minimize collateral damage from the escalating US–Israel–Iran conflict — amid President Donald Trump’s increasingly strained posture toward traditional allies — NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has briefed ambassadors ahead of his scheduled visit to Washington to meet the US president.
According to Rutte, “Europe is supportive of the US attacks.” Yet several NATO member states have reportedly rebuffed President Trump’s call to join a mission in the Strait of Hormuz, arguing they are “not willing to put their forces in harm’s way in the middle of a war they did not start.”
Meanwhile, Iran has escalated its warnings. Its deputy foreign minister cautioned that “any country that joins in the aggression against Iran… will also be legitimate targets for retaliation.” That declaration has placed EU states with military bases or naval assets within range on heightened alert.
Under mounting pressure, NATO appears divided — between those advocating military deployment, those favoring a purely diplomatic approach, and others opposed to involvement altogether. However, given Europe’s proximity and Iran’s capacity to extend missile strikes beyond the Gulf region, neutrality may prove difficult to sustain.
If Iran were to expand its attacks into Europe, the development could evoke memories of the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 — an event that drew the United States into World War II after it had sought to avoid direct involvement.
A Historical Parallel?
History offers a cautionary tale. In the 1930s and early 1940s, tensions between the United States and Japan escalated over Tokyo’s expansion in Asia. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and its full-scale war with China in 1937 alarmed Washington, which viewed these actions as aggression threatening American interests in the Pacific.
To pressure Japan to withdraw from China, the US froze Japanese assets in July 1941 and imposed an oil embargo. Japan, which relied on the US for approximately 80 percent of its oil imports, faced a dire strategic dilemma. With limited reserves, Japanese leaders calculated they had only one to two years before their war machine would grind to a halt.
Does this scenario not echo current US sanctions and economic pressure on Iran?
At the time, Japan sought to secure oil-rich territories in Southeast Asia but feared intervention from the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. Its strategy was to incapacitate the fleet through a surprise attack before consolidating territorial gains. Despite ongoing diplomatic negotiations throughout 1941, neither side compromised. The US demanded withdrawal from China; Japan insisted on relief from sanctions.
By late November 1941, Japanese leaders concluded that war was inevitable. The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to cripple American resolve and force a negotiated peace. Instead, it unified the United States and drew it fully into World War II.
Could the current US–Israel strikes on Iran — and Tehran’s retaliatory posture — similarly trigger a broader and unintended global confrontation?
Europe’s Anxiety and Strategic Calculations
Signs of European unease are evident. Speaking in Brussels, Kaja Kallas warned: “It would be in the interest of everybody if this war stops. The Iranian regime’s indiscriminate attacks against its neighbours carry the risk of dragging the region into a broader war.”
Her remarks reflect Europe’s dilemma. Multiple high-level meetings are currently underway in Brussels:
- Track One: EU foreign ministers exploring diplomatic off-ramps.
- Track Two: NATO officials reassessing alliance cohesion and US commitment.
- Track Three: Energy ministers preparing contingency plans for potential fuel shortages.
The economic stakes are high. Iran’s obstruction of the narrow Strait of Hormuz — a critical maritime chokepoint through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and significant fertilizer supplies pass daily — has disrupted markets. For Asia in particular, the blockage amounts to economic suffocation, with cascading effects across the global economy.
Africa: Unexpectedly Insulated?
Interestingly, Africa — often the most vulnerable during global crises due to structural dependencies — appears comparatively insulated this time. A key factor is the growing output of the Dangote Refinery, which has begun bridging gaps in fuel and fertilizer supply within Africa and beyond, including parts of Asia.
In addition, ongoing structural reforms across several African economies, including Nigeria, have strengthened resilience against external shocks — a contrast to the severe economic disruptions experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic and previous global recessions.
In fact Africa may benefit if the chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz by lran continues resulting in more vessels (ships) using the alternative maritime route such as the Cape of Good Hope which passes through Africa but currently attracting less maritime traffic.
Such a development could enable the African continent play more strategic role and earn more income from shipping.
Before examing further consequences of the war in lran for the gulf region where large consignments of oil/ gas and fertilizer is trapped, it is important to reflect on the intellectual root of the so-called “madman theory”- the strategy of projecting unpredictability to deter adversaries.
The Larger Question
The unfolding crisis raises profound strategic and moral questions. Does the projection of calculated unpredictability deter escalation — or does it invite miscalculation? Can reciprocal threats produce stability, or do they accelerate confrontation?
History suggests that when diplomacy collapses under the weight of pride and pressure, unintended consequences often follow.
Whether the current conflict remains regional or evolves into something far wider may depend less on military capability than on political restraint — and the willingness of global actors to step back from the brink.
Historical records trace the origins of the Madman Theory to President Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War. Nixon sought to convince North Vietnam and the Soviet Union that he was unpredictable and capable of taking extreme actions — even risking nuclear war — in order to force an end to the conflict.
This approach was partly shaped by his observations of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s handling of the Korean War and was later refined with the assistance of his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger.
Nixon’s objective was to cultivate an image of a leader who was “obsessed,” “angry,” and potentially “unrestrained,” thereby making his threats appear credible. He famously told his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman: “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war.”
In 1969, Nixon operationalized the theory through a secret global nuclear alert known as the “Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test,” which involved B-52 bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons flying near Soviet airspace. Although the strategy did not produce the desired breakthrough in Vietnam, analysts believe it unsettled Moscow and may have influenced Soviet calculations.
A closer look at historical events reveals a striking pattern: while North Vietnam appeared largely unfazed by Nixon’s brinkmanship, the Soviet Union reacted with greater concern. In that sense, history seems to echo itself today. Iran, much like Vietnam in the late 1960s, appears publicly undeterred by President Trump’s threats, projecting patience and readiness — even signaling preparedness for ground warfare should the United States deploy troops.
Meanwhile, Europe appears increasingly apprehensive. Just as Moscow was wary that Nixon might follow through on his extreme rhetoric, European leaders now seem uneasy about the possibility that President Trump could translate words into action.
From this perspective, the Madman Theory may not necessarily intimidate the primary adversary, but it often unsettles secondary actors — allies and rivals alike — who must calculate the risks of misjudgment and escalation.
Whether such a strategy ultimately produces diplomatic leverage or heightens instability remains a matter of debate. What history does suggest, however, is that the perception of unpredictability can reverberate far beyond its intended target — sometimes with unintended consequences.
The entire world must come together one way or the other to put an end to the ongoing madness from all the parties to the armed conflict in the Gulf region lets we all become witness to another world war.
Lets face reality. Are we certain lran does not already posses some nuclear bomb capacity?
After all it was assumed it had no ability and capacity to launch missiles which was thought to have been eliminated untill it sucessfully shot down two US airplanes to the surprise of US forces.
This is not to encourage lran to remain belligerent with the hope Trump or the US would become fatigued and weary.
Such a mindset may turn out to be a catastropic miscalculation as lran may lose its current underdog sympathy which the world always initially dishes out to perceived victims and which later starts to wane and piter out as the crisis starts stinging and patience run out worldwide due to the pain inflicted by their actions that most would start deeming as irrational and unreasonable.
I will personally not rule out President Trump regaining his popularity in the US and around the world if the war in lran persists and the lranian choke hold on the Strait of Hormuz is sustained such that it might become intolerable.
So, expecting that the Republican Party may suffer electoral set back during midterm elections coming up in November and the Democratic Party would take control of both the senate and house of representatives , so President Trump maybe impeached may be like waiting for Goddot in the Greek mythology.
Magnus Onyibe, an entrepreneur, public policy analyst, author, democracy advocate, development strategist, an alumnus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA, a Commonwealth Institute scholar, and a former commissioner in the Delta State government, sent this piece from Lagos.