As the House of Representatives on June 11 passed the constitutional amendment required to accommodate a state/local policing system in Nigeria, and the Senate has also passed the bill through a second reading, awaiting final reading and conclusion of the amendment process at the national level before two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly (24 states) follow suit, the momentum behind the reform continues to gather pace.
The attention that this constitutional amendment is receiving reflects the urgency and seriousness with which both the executive and legislative branches of government are addressing the need to end, or at least drastically reduce, the menace of insecurity currently ravaging our country. There is a growing recognition that insecurity could become even more widespread if the idea of state and local policing is not reintroduced urgently.
The proposed restructuring of Nigeria’s security architecture is necessary to fill the gap created by the overreliance on a kinetic approach to crime-fighting through the use of military force, guns, and bullets alone. This contrasts with the more effective and sustainable approach that combines security operations with non-kinetic strategies, including intelligence gathering through local policing structures and collaboration with traditional rulers who are deeply rooted in grassroots communities. Such leaders are better positioned to mediate disputes before they escalate into full-blown crises, as evidenced by the current deterioration in security that has compelled the urgent push for state policing.
Although the proposed return to state and local policing would be a game-changer in restoring peace and harmony across Nigeria, it is not a silver bullet that will magically eliminate the reign of terror currently stalking our beloved nation.
Rather, a second and equally important piece of the puzzle is the reinstatement of traditional institutions, which played a critical role in governance during the pre-independence era and in the early years following independence from 1960 to 1966. That was before the military intervened, abruptly ending Nigeria’s barely six-year-old democratic experiment and taking over the administration of the country at a time when democratic governance was still at a nascent stage.
Apart from being custodians of our cultural heritage and embodiments of our traditions, our monarchs possess invaluable advantages in intelligence gathering and conflict resolution.
Leaving this critical institution out of efforts to correct the mistakes made by the military in January 1966—when, through the instrumentality of Decree No. 34, also known as the Unification Decree, the administration of Nigeria became centralized—would be a grave oversight. The leaders of the counter-coup in 1966 retained the centralized structure, which subsequently became entrenched in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As such, failing to restore a meaningful governance role for traditional rulers could render the return of state and local policing less effective than it ought to be.
Below is how I made the case in my book The Imperative of State Police in Nigeria in my effort to draw the attention of lawmakers to the role of traditional rulers—a subject that is currently not receiving the level of attention it deserves. The book, published before the constitutional amendment was passed by the House of Representatives, is my humble contribution to the renewed effort by the current administration to place the fight against insecurity, which remains the most pressing concern of Nigerians, at the forefront of national discourse.
Here is the excerpt:
The Role of Traditional Rulers in Ending Insecurity in Nigeria and Complementing State/Local Policing.
One governance institution that played a critical role in maintaining peace and security at the grassroots level during the colonial and early post-independence eras was the traditional institution. Emirs, Obas, Igwes, chiefs, and district heads remain the closest authorities to many rural communities and are enduring legacies of the British system of indirect rule.
Although traditional rulers are primarily custodians of culture and tradition, they historically served as important facilitators of grassroots security. However, their formal role in governance was gradually diminished following the 1966 coup and the promulgation of the Unification Decree No. 34 by General Aguiyi-Ironsi, which centralized governance and weakened both local policing and traditional authority structures.
Before their removal from the governance framework, traditional rulers performed several key security functions:
1. Early Warning and Intelligence Gathering
Traditional rulers possess intimate knowledge of their communities. They are often the first to receive information about suspicious movements, criminal activities, recruitment by insurgent groups, and the presence of strangers. In states such as Zamfara, Borno, Benue, and Plateau, district heads have historically provided valuable intelligence on bandit and insurgent activities long before security agencies became aware of them. In this regard, they functioned much like county sheriffs in the United States, leveraging deep local knowledge and trusted community networks.
2. Community Mediation and Conflict Prevention
Traditional rulers have long served as mediators in local disputes. Farmer-herder clashes, land disputes, and chieftaincy conflicts are often resolved through dialogue, customary practices, and traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms before they escalate into violence. In some states, monarchs continue to facilitate peace committees involving farmers and herders.
3. Mobilizing Community Security Structures
Where formal policing is inadequate, traditional rulers often work with vigilante groups, hunters, Amotekun operatives, Yan Sakai, and other community-based security networks. They help vet members, establish rules of engagement, and serve as a bridge between local security groups and formal agencies such as the police and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). Their involvement helps promote legitimacy, coordination, and accountability within these structures.
4. Supporting Deradicalization and Reintegration
The trust traditional rulers enjoy within their communities can be invaluable in encouraging repentant insurgents to surrender and reintegrate into society. In the North-East, some emirs have supported initiatives such as Operation Safe Corridor, helping to facilitate dialogue, rehabilitation, and reintegration efforts that would otherwise be difficult for security agencies to undertake alone.
5. Shaping Social Values and Public Behaviour
Traditional rulers also wield significant moral influence. Through religious gatherings, town hall meetings, festivals, and palace engagements, they can mobilize communities against kidnapping, cultism, drug abuse, and other social vices. Their ability to shape public attitudes and behaviour remains one of their greatest strengths.
A notable example was the intervention of the Oba of Benin against human trafficking, which reportedly contributed to a reduction in the trafficking of young women from the region to Europe.
The Need for Constitutional Recognition
Despite their influence, traditional rulers currently rely almost entirely on persuasion because the 1999 Constitution assigns them no formal security responsibilities. Most traditional institutions also lack the resources and security infrastructure needed to perform broader public safety functions.
Nevertheless, traditional rulers effectively served as Nigeria’s first responders to local security challenges before the 1966 coup. As the country debates the reintroduction of state and local policing, there is a compelling case for restoring a clearly defined constitutional role for traditional institutions in intelligence gathering, conflict resolution, community engagement, and security coordination.
While law enforcement agencies such as the Police and the Department of State Services (DSS) should continue to retain responsibility for armed security operations, traditional rulers can complement their efforts by leveraging trust, local knowledge, and community influence.
Indeed, one lesson from Nigeria’s prolonged insecurity crisis is that military-driven, predominantly kinetic approaches have not been sufficient. Increasingly, policymakers are recognizing the importance of non-kinetic strategies that emphasize community engagement, intelligence gathering, dialogue, and conflict prevention—areas in which traditional rulers possess unique advantages.
It is also important to recognize that traditional institutions operate differently across Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria, the emirate system is hierarchical and centralized, with clear chains of authority extending from the Emir to district, village, and ward heads. This structure gives traditional rulers in the North significant administrative influence and organizational capacity.
Ultimately, restoring an appropriate role for traditional rulers within Nigeria’s evolving security architecture could help bridge the gap between formal security institutions and local communities, thereby strengthening efforts to address the country’s growing security challenges.
Traditional Rulers as Partners in Community Security.
The role of traditional rulers in addressing insecurity varies across Nigeria because of the different historical structures that shaped their institutions.
In Northern Nigeria, the emirate system is centralized and hierarchical, with authority flowing from the Emir to district, village, and ward heads. This command structure enables emirs to mobilize vigilantes, enforce curfews, regulate grazing activities, and intervene quickly in emerging conflicts. Historically, emirs also exercised influence over land allocation, making them important stakeholders in resolving farmer-herder disputes.
Traditional institutions in states such as Kano, Sokoto, and Borno remain integrated into local governance and often work closely with security agencies such as the Police and the DSS. However, their effectiveness is limited by the absence of a clearly defined constitutional role within Nigeria’s security architecture.
By contrast, traditional rulers in Southern Nigeria—Obas, Ezes, Igwes, and Obis—operate within more decentralized and communal systems. Their authority is largely moral and cultural rather than administrative. Rather than issuing directives, they persuade, convene stakeholders, build consensus, and influence public behaviour through respect, tradition, and moral suasion.
As a result, community policing in the South tends to rely on partnerships between traditional rulers and local security organizations such as the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), Amotekun, Ebube Agu, town unions, and local hunters. While southern monarchs do not directly command these groups, they provide legitimacy, guidance, and community support for their activities.
Southern rulers also play a significant role in mediating disputes, including land conflicts, cult-related violence, market disagreements, and other communal tensions. Unlike the North, where security challenges are often linked to insurgency and banditry, conflicts in the South are generally more communal or criminal in nature.
Consequently, northern traditional rulers can sometimes function as quasi-administrative authorities during crises, while their southern counterparts serve primarily as community mediators and consensus builders. Both roles are important, but the tools available to each reflect their distinct historical and cultural backgrounds.
This difference helps explain why responses to banditry in states such as Zamfara differ from responses to cultism and communal violence in states such as Rivers and Anambra.
A useful comparison can be drawn with county sheriffs in the United States. Sheriffs are elected officials who possess deep knowledge of their communities and often serve as the first point of contact for local security concerns. Although Nigerian traditional rulers are not elected, they historically performed similar grassroots functions before the 1966 coup, using their local knowledge, influence, and community trust to help maintain order.
For this reason, proponents of state and local policing argue that traditional rulers should be formally reintegrated into Nigeria’s security framework. Restoring their pre-1966 roles in intelligence gathering, conflict resolution, and community engagement could help bridge the gap between security agencies and local communities, strengthen grassroots intelligence networks, and enhance efforts to combat the growing insecurity confronting the nation.
Traditional Rulers, Security, and the Case for Constitutional Reform.
Advocates of a greater role for traditional rulers in Nigeria’s security architecture argue that they bring three strategic advantages: grassroots access, legitimacy, and speed of response.
First, traditional rulers possess deep local knowledge. While a police officer in Lagos may not immediately identify a newcomer in a ward in Kano, a district head often can. Formalizing their role would largely recognize and institutionalize functions they already perform informally through their extensive community networks.
Second, traditional rulers command legitimacy. In many rural communities, people respond not only to the law but also to cultural authority. Consequently, directives supported by both the police and traditional institutions often carry greater weight than those issued by security agencies alone.
Third, traditional rulers can facilitate rapid responses. With statutory backing, they could quickly mobilize local security outfits such as Amotekun, Ebube Agu, vigilante groups, and hunters, thereby strengthening grassroots security, intelligence gathering, and community vigilance.
However, integrating traditional rulers into the formal security framework would not be without challenges.
The first concern is accountability. Unlike American sheriffs, who are elected and can be sued, recalled, or voted out of office, traditional rulers are hereditary. Any constitutional role would therefore require strong oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse of power and ensure transparency.
The second challenge is politics. State governors may be reluctant to share authority with another influential institution. Restoring formal security responsibilities to traditional rulers could necessitate constitutional amendments and raise questions about the emergence of an additional layer of governance.
Third, there is the issue of uniformity. The powers appropriate for an emir overseeing hundreds of thousands of people cannot be identical to those of an Eze presiding over a handful of communities. Any framework would need to reflect Nigeria’s diverse traditional structures and historical realities.
Despite these concerns, the principle remains compelling. Rather than granting traditional rulers political or taxation powers, constitutional reforms could assign them clearly defined responsibilities in intelligence gathering, mediation, community engagement, and support for local security operations. Such an arrangement would effectively make them community security partners rather than merely ceremonial monarchs.
Why Traditional Rulers Were Removed from Governance.
The marginalization of traditional rulers dates back to the military era. Before 1966, traditional institutions were integral to governance under the Native Authority system. Emirs administered local government structures in the North, Obas participated in regional governance in the West, and traditional rulers exercised significant influence in local administration across the country.
The January 1966 coup and General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s Unification Decree No. 34 fundamentally altered this arrangement by centralizing power and weakening federal structures. The subsequent counter-coup and civil war further reinforced military concerns about divided loyalties. Traditional rulers were increasingly viewed as regional power centers whose influence could challenge the authority of the central state.
As a result, successive military governments dismantled the Native Authority system. The abolition of Native Authorities in 1968 stripped traditional rulers of administrative and revenue-collection powers, while the 1976 Local Government Reforms replaced them with elected local government councils. The 1979 Constitution subsequently reduced traditional institutions to advisory roles under state-controlled chieftaincy councils.
Military governments justified these changes on the grounds of national integration, uniform administration, and modernization. Hereditary authority was increasingly viewed as incompatible with the democratic and centralized governance model the military sought to build.
Ironically, more than five decades later, Nigeria’s worsening insecurity is prompting renewed interest in the very institution that was sidelined. Many now argue that traditional rulers can once again contribute meaningfully to intelligence gathering, conflict resolution, community mobilization, and grassroots security management.
Lessons from the United Kingdom.
The debate over state and local policing in Nigeria also draws lessons from the United Kingdom. Under the Police Act 1964, England and Wales operated decentralized police forces with strong local oversight. By contrast, Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution established a single, centralized police force under federal control.
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 further strengthened local accountability by replacing Police Authorities with directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), who oversee policing priorities, budgets, and leadership at the local level.
While Nigeria is unlikely to replicate the British model wholesale, the UK’s experience demonstrates that local accountability and decentralized policing can coexist within a national framework.
The Imperative for Reform.
The ongoing debate over state and local policing is ultimately about strengthening security and preventing the erosion of state authority. Reports of communities paying levies to bandits and other criminal groups underscore the dangers posed by weak local security structures.
Just as Britain reformed its policing system to improve local accountability, Nigeria may need to adapt its constitutional framework to reflect present realities. Reintegrating traditional rulers into the security architecture—within clearly defined constitutional limits—could help bridge the gap between security agencies and local communities.
The irony is that an institution removed from governance in the name of centralization may now be needed to help restore security, trust, and stability at the grassroots level.
The conclusion in my book is meant to make the case of reinstating our monarchs to governance, so l wrapped it up by trying to make a powerful case as detailed below hoping it is convincing enough to make our lawmakers consider it.
Again, another excerpt.
As we all know, the reintroduction of state and local policing is not a magic bullet for ending insecurity in Nigeria.
Back in the colonial era, when local policing was in operation, it worked hand in hand with traditional rulers, who played a critical role as a de facto third tier of government with their ears firmly on the ground. However, in 1968, the role of monarchs in governance was terminated,that was followed by the 1976 replacement of the traditional institution with elected local government chairmen. Thereafter, 1979 consolidated centralized policing as the only system to be operated in Nigeria.
Apparently, these decisions were not subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Rather, they appear to have been influenced by the military’s distrust of both the police and traditional rulers, who wielded significant influence over the masses, having been deeply entrenched in Nigeria’s leadership structure since the colonial period.
Furthermore, the decision to replace hereditary traditional rulers with elected politicians may have been consistent with the spirit and letter of democracy. However, it created a dangerous vacuum that outlaws and other anti-social elements have exploited, resulting in a siege on communities across the country. This has now evolved into a staggering insecurity crisis that threatens to engulf Nigeria and suffocate it like a boa constrictor suffocates its prey.
Although the consequences of weakening both the police and traditional institutions in matters of internal security and governance did not become fully apparent until after 1999 after the return to democratic rule—nearly three decades after these changes were implemented abd during Olusegun Obasanjo‘s presidency —the proverbial chickens have now come home to roost. Jarringly, insecurity is now threatening to undermine the unprecedented 27 years of uninterrupted democratic practice that Nigerians proudly celebrated on May 29 and June 12, 2026, respectively. It also threatens to derail the significant economic reforms undertaken by President Bola Tinubu’s administration, which have been acknowledged by several local and international rating agencies.
Under President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration, beginning in 1999, attempts were made to reintroduce state and local policing. However, those efforts were rebuffed by lawmakers who threatened to impeach him, encouraged by governors who wielded considerable influence during the early years of Nigeria’s democratic transition. They opposed the concept of state police because it would require states to bear the financial burden rather than the federal government, as stipulated in the 1999 Constitution.
Furthermore, at a time when state governments were demanding a larger share of federal revenue, it was understandable that they saw little logic in assuming responsibility for funding state police, a function traditionally regarded as a federal obligation, especially when the federal government was unwilling to cede additional resources to the subnational governments. They never knew that the consequences of such selfish decision would snowball into the storm of insecurity currently blowing across Nigeria .
This history is well documented in several essays reproduced in this book, many of which were written following Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999.
It is worth noting that some of the articles I wrote on insecurity and the need for state police during the early years of democracy are not included here because digital archiving of newspaper publications had not yet become commonplace. Consequently, only articles written from 2002 onward are featured.
Beyond the imperative of state police, there is also a compelling need to reintegrate traditional rulers into governance, as was the case before 1968. Doing so would enable Nigeria to fully harness the benefits of its rich cultural and traditional heritage through the active participation of monarchs in governance—albeit without restoring their former tax collection powers. Without such reforms, the country may struggle to overcome the scourge of insecurity.
Arising from the factors identified above, it is likely that once the ongoing constitutional amendment process accommodating state police is concluded, the question of reinstating traditional rulers as part of the governance structure will become the next major point of contention if it is not addressed during the current exercise.
Closely linked to this issue is the likely resurgence of demands for a review of the revenue-sharing formula. Governors are expected to intensify calls for a larger share of national revenue, particularly if the broader constitutional review undertaken by the National Assembly fails to address the financial implications of state policing.
Notwithstanding these challenges, governance is a continuum, and adjustments to rules and processes can always be made to accommodate changing realities and evolving societal needs.
The imperative for state police in Nigeria is therefore undeniable. Likewise, the need for continuous reforms in policing structures—as seen in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada in response to urbanization, changing lifestyles, and technological advancements—cannot be overstated. Nigeria has a population estimated at 230 million people, while the United Kingdom, with approximately 69.9 million people, which is a little more than a quarter of Nigeria’s population has reviewed and reformed its policing system at least four times since 1964.
After overcoming the hurdles associated with the return of state and local policing, and subsequently reinstating traditional rulers in governance to bridge the intelligence gap at the grassroots level, the revenue-sharing formula will also require significant restructuring to address the inevitable challenge of funding the new policing architecture to be operated by subnational governments.
That is the beauty of democracy. It is designed to respond to the genuine needs of the people rather than remain rigid like military dictatorships, which are built on the doctrine of command and control. In retrospect, Nigeria appears to have thrown out the baby with the bathwater when it abolished state policing and removed traditional rulers from governance after 1966, despite their proven contributions to internal security, as demonstrated throughout this book.
The fact that it took so long to align policing structures with the aspirations of Nigerians—many of whom have become victims of insecurity perpetrated by bandits, insurgents, and ethnic agitators—largely because governors were reluctant to assume the associated financial burden and preferred to retain discretionary control over opaque security vote expenditures, constitutes a significant indictment of previous democratic administrations.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that it is under the reform-oriented administration of President Bola Tinubu that the most significant police reform since 1966, aimed at restoring the police to their constitutional role as the primary agency responsible for internal security, is finally taking shape.
This achievement complements other bold and necessary reforms, including the removal of fuel subsidies which has been proven to be unsustainable, the managed floatation of the naira to eliminate distortions created by multiple exchange-rate windows, and the direct allocation of funds to local governments rather than routing them through state governments, thereby promoting economic activity across the country’s 774 local government areas amongst other reforms.
These are reforms that have long been overdue but which successive military and civilian administrations either failed to implement or lacked the political will to pursue. President Tinubu, working in concert with the current crop of governors, has chosen to confront these challenges directly by agreeing to reinstate state and local policing and tackle the devastating spectre of insecurity that has continued to afflict millions of long-suffering Nigerians.
Hopefully , with this current bold initiative and policy breakthrough of reintroducing state and local policing, Nigeria will return to stability to enable the benefits of the economic and political reforms embarked upon in the past three years take hold so that the gains currently being only heard of via statistics will percolate down to the masses who are currently overburdened and overstretched as such can not wait to enjoy the much vaunted dividends of democracy in their lived experience.
